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 Ironically, it was an arms-control treaty that set the U.S. Navy on the course of building a fleet centered on fast, large-displacement, heavy-tonnage, full-flight-
deck aircraft carriers. Such ships sometimes are referred to as supercarriers.
THE HISTORICAL PROGRESSION
The First Carriers
The Washington Naval Treaty of 1921–22—now at its hundredth anniversary—
was an attempt by President Warren G. Harding and his Secretary of State, 
Charles Evans Hughes, to restrain a global naval arms race, particularly the naval 
competition among Great Britain, the United States, and Japan.1 Idealism played 
a role, but there also was huge financial incentive; for the United States, with its 
army rapidly demobilized following World War I, naval expenditure was one of 
the largest federal government outlays.2 And the most expensive platform was 
the battleship—the capital ship of its day. Much as nuclear warheads were during 
the later SALT/START era, battleships were the 
ultimate measure of military power.3
In contrast, the fledgling aircraft carrier consti-
tuted an auxiliary issue during treaty negotiations, 
and for the United States and Britain an aggregate 
limit of 135,000 tons eventually was set, rather than 
any specific number of platforms; imperial Japan 
would be permitted 81,000 tons, per the 5 : 5 : 3 for-
mula that guided the conference.4 However, there 
were some sublimits; no future carrier individually 
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was to exceed 27,000 tons displacement (nor carry any gun larger than an eight-
inch). By the time of the treaty, Britain—which had invented the all-aviation war-
ship—had commissioned five aircraft carriers, with two others under construc-
tion. All except the first displaced between 26,000 and 29,000 tons—the obvious 
source of the treaty limit on individual ships. In contrast, the United States had 
not yet commissioned its first carrier, USS Langley (CV 1), which was a converted 
collier that would have a displacement of approximately 14,000 tons at full load. 
Japan was building its first aircraft carrier—the world’s first purpose-built carrier 
constructed from the keel up, not a conversion—IJN Hosho, displacing slightly 
less than 10,000 tons.5 In consideration of the Royal Navy’s advantage, the treaty 
conference declared Langley and Hosho to be “experimental,” thereby not counting 
against the tonnage limit.6
To American naval aviation, the 135,000-ton limit was actually a godsend. The 
U.S. Congress had expressed no interest previously in ever building an aircraft 
carrier fleet to that aggregate size, and in its long-range planning for the construc-
tion of future carriers the Navy leadership had expected much less from a fiscally 
conservative Congress.7 Yet throughout the life of the treaty, the Department of 
the Navy was able to argue that the legislature needed to authorize building to 
that limit to maintain parity with the other treaty signatories—an argument that 
Congress eventually accepted.8
More importantly, there was another method of appealing to frugality. 
In addition to the United States disposing of older battleships and cruisers to 
achieve treaty limits in their respective categories, there were a number of under- 
construction warships, authorized during World War I but not completed, that 
would need to be scrapped. The American delegation to the Washington Confer-
ence proposed that each of the principal naval powers be allowed to convert two 
unfinished hulls into carriers, even if their displacements exceeded the 27,000-
ton individual limit. Although this was of no advantage to a Royal Navy that was 
almost at its aggregate limit already, the proposal was accepted. As the U.S. Navy 
already had selected two unfinished battle cruisers, both of which likely would 
displace 33,000 tons, the conference agreed to 33,000 as the conversion limit. 
From this conversion came USS Lexington (CV 2) and USS Saratoga (CV 3).9 
Until construction of USS Midway (CV 41) in 1945, they were the biggest and 
fastest (thirty-one-plus knots) aircraft carriers the United States had built. Their 
large hulls and flight decks allowed them to accommodate the steadily increasing 
size of naval aircraft without the need for continual modification.10
Small Carriers and the Flying-Deck Cruiser
The true significance of the acquisition of Lexington and Saratoga is that—until 
the two ships proved their superiority in the fleet battle problems of the late 
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1920s—even the staunchest supporters of naval aviation within the Navy’s lead-
ership were convinced that a larger number of smaller carriers would be more 
operationally effective than a smaller number of supercarriers.11
Rear Admiral William A. Moffett, the first chief of the Department of the Na-
vy’s Bureau of Aeronautics—and often considered the father of naval aviation—
was one of those so convinced.12 While pleased with the commissioning of Lex-
ington and Saratoga—whose allowance he himself essentially had arranged, as an 
influential expert assigned to the Washington Conference—Moffett frequently 
stated that “there is a far greater flight deck area available on a large number of 
small ships than a small number of large ships.”13
Following the Washington Conference, Moffett drew up proposals for five car-
riers of 13,800 tons—the smallest tonnage that could provide a flight deck of ac-
ceptable length.14 With 66,000 of the 135,000 tons permitted by treaty taken up by 
Lexington and Saratoga, the five small carriers would bring the Navy to the treaty 
limit while maximizing the number of flight decks.
However, Moffett considered the resulting seven total carriers to be insuffi-
cient, so he drafted an additional proposal for the construction of eight hybrid 
“flying deck cruisers.”15 Such a vessel would retain its forward emplaced guns but 
would have a flight deck covering most of the ship aft of the deckhouse. Mof-
fett’s argument was that, as cruisers, these ships would not count under the treaty 
limitations on carriers.16 Estimated tonnage for each of these vessels was 10,000 
tons—the limit for cruisers.17
The flying-deck cruiser actually gained the support of the Chief of Naval 
Operations (CNO), Admiral William V. Pratt, who—unlike Moffett—viewed 
it more as a cruiser than a small carrier.18 However, the Navy General Board, 
whose recommendations to the Secretary of the Navy effectively took prece-
dence over the individual views of the CNO (until Admiral Ernest J. King be-
came CNO as well as Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet, in March 1942), was 
cool to the idea, rejecting it first in 1925.19 The follow-on to the Washington 
Conference, the London Naval Conference of 1930, retained the 135,000-ton 
limit on aircraft carriers.20 This caused the General Board to reconsider, and 
Secretary of the Navy Charles F. Adams requested $20 million for an experi-
mental flying-deck cruiser in the Navy’s fiscal year (FY) 1932 budget request to 
Congress—unsuccessfully.21 There were at least two congressional supporters, 
but by then expenditures for the Navy no longer were a priority.22 With the 
onset of the Great Depression, neither the 13,800-ton small carriers nor the 
10,000-ton flying-deck cruisers were built. Congress simply would not provide 
the money, and by the mid-1930s few in the naval leadership viewed either 
solution as a cost-effective method of massing airpower at sea.
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Every Ship a Carrier?
Additionally, Moffett advocated that all ships, from battleship to destroyer, 
should embark aircraft: floatplanes (seaplanes), launched from trainable cata-
pults. On their return, such planes would land on the ocean surface, then be 
winched back aboard. Tests proved that installation on destroyers was impracti-
cal; however, many battleships and cruisers were fitted with two scout aircraft. 
Moffett had argued for at least four—two scouts and two fighters. Proposed for 
the biggest ships was an addition of two bombers, for a total of six planes. In his 
estimate, these aircraft could conduct “small scale” offensive operations until the 
arrival of a carrier.23
Selected ships retained and operated catapult aircraft in World War II for 
scouting and for spotting for gunfire, particularly when carriers were not avail-
able (such as at the 1944 Normandy invasion). However, the physical limitations 
of such seaplanes made them incapable of dueling with wheeled carrier aircraft 
and most land-based planes. The pre–World War II Navy was never afraid to 
retain “legacy systems” that might prove useful, and it experimented with and op-
erated seaplanes from combatants for twenty-four years. But the sea itself proved 
too treacherous a landing deck, regardless of its “low acquisition cost.” Not only 
was it difficult to mass effects from small numbers of dispersed seaplanes—all of 
them inferior in combat capabilities to their land-based counterparts—but the 
environment itself proved the concept impracticable, and conducting small-scale 
offensive operations appeared suicidal.
However, technology did demonstrate eventually (about forty years after Mof-
fett’s proposal) that the concept of every ship being able to carry aircraft was, in 
fact, viable—once the helicopter was perfected. Starting in the 1970s, the U.S. Na-
vy’s Light Airborne Multipurpose System (LAMPS) embarked at least one aircraft 
(helicopter), and often two, on almost all cruisers, destroyers, and frigates, while 
a landing spot for a visiting helicopter was added to almost every other type of 
naval vessel.
These were very specialized aircraft, primarily designed for low, slow, anti-
submarine warfare (ASW) operations, not for contesting with carrier-based 
conventional aircraft. LAMPS—like the problematic, preceding, drone antisub-
marine helicopter (known as DASH) program and the subsequent embarked-
drone aircraft of today—could be said to “conduct ‘small scale’ offensive opera-
tions until the arrival of a carrier.”24 But that is only to conduct several specialized 
missions, in which the aircraft in question remain highly vulnerable to attack by 
conventional aircraft.25 The most advanced vertical/short-takeoff-and-landing 
(V/STOL) aircraft—even if they could be operated from ships smaller than big-
deck amphibious warships—cannot match the range, lift capacity, or combat ef-
fectiveness of carrier aircraft (despite vociferous claims to the contrary by their 
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proponents).26 In any case, the concept clearly has yet to be proved as a substitute 
for a large-deck, all-aviation ship.
The Light Carrier Experience: USS Ranger
Moffett continued to consider the advantages of numerous smaller carriers, even 
as the speed and size of USS Saratoga enabled its famous simulated surprise at-
tack on the Panama Canal in 1929.27 Less heralded—perhaps because it seemed 
so disturbing in the light of subsequent events—was Lexington and Saratoga’s 
combined simulated surprise attack on Pearl Harbor in 1932.28 Rear Admiral Jo-
seph M. Reeves, Commander, Aircraft Squadrons, Battle Fleet, gradually had in-
creased the aircraft complement of Saratoga, as well as on the small, slow Langley; 
while Saratoga was rated at seventy-four aircraft, Reeves increased its air wing to 
ninety, and Langley’s aircraft load was doubled from twenty-four to forty-eight.29
Theoretically, two small carriers could provide the same number of aircraft in 
the air if they could be operated together against one lone large carrier. But what 
bedeviled Moffett—as it has every other small-carrier proponent up to today—is 
that he could not build a suitably capable smaller carrier for half the price of a 
larger ship that would have more than double the combat effectiveness. In building 
USS Ranger (CV 4) at 18,000 tons full displacement, he was able to keep the finan-
cial cost (in contemporaneous dollars) to approximately half the final construction 
cost of either Lexington or Saratoga, but it was at the opportunity cost of speed, 
survivability (no underwater protection, and consistently overweight in terms of 
sea keeping), and aircraft and weapons load. (In addition, the final costs of Lexing-
ton and Saratoga, which included a 90 percent overrun, were magnified by the na-
ture of their conversion, so they were not considered representative.) Ranger, com-
missioned in 1934, initially could not carry torpedo bombers—which took on a 
greater significance during World War II than it bore at the ship’s commissioning.30
More importantly, Ranger’s small size meant that it could not keep up with 
the continuing increases in size and maintenance requirements of newer aircraft, 
unlike Lexington and Saratoga and subsequent large carriers. This increase was 
required particularly to match the fighting capabilities of Japanese aircraft. So 
as aircraft on both sides became more capable, Ranger slipped toward obsoles-
cence.31 The result was that the naval leadership deemed World War II Pacific 
operations too dangerous for Ranger, so it was kept in the Atlantic, where opera-
tions against U-boats were considered to be of slower pace and where the ship 
would not face attack by massed enemy aircraft. Ranger did participate in support 
of Operation TORCH and the North Africa landings.32 However, its overall contri-
butions were not considered significant, because land-based aircraft were readily 
available in the European theater.33
Rear Admiral Moffett did not live to see the commissioning of Ranger; he 
died in the crash of the airship USS Akron (ZRS 4) in 1933. However, a series of 
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“carrier spectrum studies” conducted prior to and during the development of 
Ranger estimated that four thousand additional tons of aircraft carrier displace-
ment resulted in the ability to add fifteen more aircraft—which was why Ranger 
was built with an 18,000-ton displacement rather than the 13,800 that would have 
provided five carriers under the treaty.34 But an additional four thousand on top 
of that might have added even more. Thus, the overall conclusion was that large 
carriers could be built at less of a relative incremental cost than was possible by 
restricting them to a smaller size. Reportedly, Moffett later in his career expressed 
regret at the decision to build Ranger. Moffett’s biographer William Trimble sum-
marized the admiral’s conclusions, as contained in a 1931 letter to the Secretary 
of the Navy, as follows: “greater displacement, he argued, allowed higher speed, 
more compartmentalization, armor protection for machinery and magazine 
spaces, and more hangar and flight deck space.”35 The experiment did not work.36
The follow-on Yorktown (CV 5) and Enterprise (CV 6) were each of 25,000 
tons full displacement. Another small carrier, USS Wasp (CV 7), similar to Rang-
er, was built at 18,000 tons displacement; however, it had been approved in 1934, 
before Ranger proved itself inadequate.37 Subsequent fleet carriers were built at 
34,000 tons full displacement.
The Light and Escort Carriers of World War II
The U.S. Navy did build light and escort carriers to complement fleet carriers 
during World War II. Most were vessels specialized for the escort of convoys, air 
support for amphibious operations, and ASW. Flattops of their type were consid-
ered “mobilization carriers.” Many were converted civilian ships. The inexorable 
requirement to build warships as quickly as possible precluded taking the time 
necessary to construct an all-large-carrier force. To some extent, these ships were 
considered expendable—and some were expended. Again, the Navy needed mass 
and numbers, given the attrition inevitable in warfare.
The twenty-fifth through the thirtieth USN aircraft carriers were considered 
“light carriers” or “austere carriers” and were designated CVL. Each was built 
in two years or less, most were commissioned in 1943, and they sacrificed size 
and survivability for speed of construction.38 Using materials already in the pro-
duction pipeline, some were built on cruiser hulls.39 Their displacements ranged 
from 16,000 to 19,000 tons. The Navy intended to operate them alongside the 
large fleet carriers (within large, carrier-centered battle groups)—as wingmen, if 
you will—not independently.40 The ratio of propulsion plant to displacement was 
proportionally large, to generate the thirty-knot speed necessary to keep up with 
the larger fleet carriers. The CVLs’ goal was to provide as much additional air 
cover to the task force as possible. Operating within (and protected by) the task 
force, all these ships survived the war; however, “they did not lend themselves to 
the changing requirements of carrier aviation post war.”41
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Escort carriers (CVEs) were built only to support the escorting of convoys 
(ASW), amphibious operations, and such duties as transporting aircraft (includ-
ing land-based aircraft) to replace losses in the island campaigns.42 Some were 
of new construction, some were conversions; a total of 120 were built during 
the war.43 Many were built for the Royal Navy. Again, speed of construction was 
everything; some were readied in ten months, from launch to commissioning. 
Their displacements ranged from 10,000 to 14,000 tons. Flight decks were one-
third the size of those of fleet carriers.
With an average maximum speed of twenty knots, the CVEs could not operate 
with a battle group. During amphibious operations they were expected to remain 
under the air cover provided by the large fleet carriers or land-based U.S. Ma-
rine aviation, if the Marines were established ashore.44 Protection against surface 
warships and submarines was provided by cruisers and destroyers. If the CVEs 
encountered Japanese ships when they were without protective carrier air cover 
(such as in the October 1944 battle of Samar), they were expected to withdraw. 
At Samar, a force of escort carriers and destroyers fought off a Japanese force, but 
at a loss of two CVEs by surface fire (plus two destroyers and a destroyer escort) 
and over one thousand sailors—more than at the Battles of the Coral Sea and 
Midway combined.45
CVLs and CVEs were built to provide additional mass and numbers, to over-
whelm Japanese forces. To put that in perspective, the Japanese entered World 
War II with eight carriers and built twenty-one total CV, CVL, and CVE equiva-
lents during the war, whereas the United States entered World War II with eight 
fleet carriers (split between two oceans), then built 146 carriers of all sizes during 
the war (that number is dependent on the counting rules). To repeat: 21 versus 
146.
CVLs and CVEs never were expected to substitute for fleet carriers. Rather, 
they depended on fleet carriers for their survival.46
Postwar Carriers
USS Midway (CV 41) was the first aircraft carrier completed after the war, al-
though its construction was started during the war. With an original displace-
ment of approximately 45,000 tons, the ship dwarfed all previous carriers. It was 
the lead ship of an eight-carrier class.
Midway served for forty-seven years. Its large size allowed it and two counter-
parts, Franklin D. Roosevelt (CV 42) and Coral Sea (CV 43), to be converted to 
handle jet aircraft via the addition of an angled flight deck (among other modi-
fications). A handful of the previous, smaller, World War II Essex-class carriers 
also were converted to handle jets, allowing them to take their turn on Yankee 
Station during the Vietnam War. The unconverted ships of the Midway class went 
on to other duties; for example, USS Valley Forge (CV 45) and the even older 
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Essex-class USS Boxer (CV 21) could be considered the first amphibious assault 
ships, comparable in concept to today’s USS America (LHA 6), which, like Valley 
Forge, does not have a well deck and displaces 45,000 tons.47
The bureaucratically bloody Department of Defense fight in 1949 over the 
proposed supercarrier United States (80,000 tons) resulted in cancelation of the 
program and a seeming repudiation of the value of the big-deck carrier—largely 
under the assumption that the next war would consist of nuclear strikes con-
ducted by U.S. Air Force bombers. For many of the Navy participants, it took on 
the appearance of a fight for the service’s very existence (along with that of the 
U.S. Marine Corps).48
However, subsequent to the cancelation, real-world requirements dramatically 
changed perceptions and assumptions. The swift advance of the North Korean 
army into the South captured almost all land air bases available to the South Ko-
rean and U.S. air forces, so the initial means of applying airpower was the remain-
ing World War II–era aircraft carriers. Thus, when the six-ship USS Forrestal 
class was built (1952–61), there was much less opposition.49 Again, the perception 
was that the fast, large-displacement, heavy-tonnage, full-flight-deck aircraft car-
rier had been determined to be both necessary and combat proven.
Lingering Proposals and Alternatives
This did not mean that alternative proposals disappeared.50 The continuing 
development of the helicopter and the prospective development of V/STOL 
technology inspired a continuing search for (presumably) lower-cost alternatives.
Helicopters certainly could not provide the capabilities of fixed-wing aircraft, 
but they could land Marines ashore, thereby bypassing the difficulties of surface 
amphibious landings. Therefore, supposedly lower-cost, specialized, “big deck” 
amphibious assault ships—which could remove this mission from the lengthy 
mission sets of conventional carriers—were justified.51
Great hopes were placed that V/STOL aircraft development would allow for 
smaller carriers that did not require long flight decks, catapults, and arresting 
gear. From 1972 to 1978, and particularly during the administration of President 
Jimmy Carter, the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Navy examined a 
bevy of small-carrier proposals.52
Frequently noted is CNO Admiral Elmo R. Zumwalt Jr.’s proposal for a V/
STOL-carrying “sea control ship.”53 However, Zumwalt himself directed the pro-
posal to the specific mission of ASW, not as an alternative to the large air wings 
and immense strike capabilities of large carriers.54 From Zumwalt’s perspective, 
the search for alternatives constituted a quest to reduce the unit cost of ships to 
“recover from the disastrous slide” in the total number of ships in the overall 
fleet as the result of the retirement of the remaining (albeit modernized) World 
War II inventory.55
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The constant refrain of these proposals was the need to reduce the per-unit 
acquisition costs of ships, and the view that the increasing costs of large-carrier 
construction—resulting primarily from the inclusion of emerging technologies, 
along with the increasing cost of labor and materials, plus inflation—made the 
ships “unaffordable.”56 However, this bumped up against the conundrum that 
V/STOL aircraft simply could not match conventional, fixed-wing aircraft in 
any mission area.57 The physical reality is that the power and thrust required to 
lift aircraft vertically result in a necessary reduction in carrying load and fuel, 
as well as a potential reduction in speed as a result of configuration.58 V/STOL 
aircraft could not compete effectively (or even survive) in an airspace dominated 
by capable, conventional military aircraft; rather, they could operate effectively 
only in conditions of limited opposing air threats.59 The development of the “ski 
jump” that allowed V/STOL aircraft to be launched via a “rolling start” could 
increase carrying load and range, since less power and fuel would be required 
at takeoff—but not so significant an improvement that they could approach the 
capabilities of conventional carrier aircraft.60 Meanwhile, development of the 
Nimitz-class, nuclear-powered, large-deck carrier (90,000 tons full-load dis-
placement) had begun.
The debates on alternatives came to a climax when President Carter vetoed the 
FY-79 defense bill since it included long-term funding for a fourth Nimitz-class 
carrier. However, the ship eventually was reinstated owing to the requirement for 
unprecedented operations in the Indian Ocean to counter the global expansion 
of the Soviet Navy, as well as trouble in the Middle East in the wake of the fun-
damentalist revolution in Iran. To respond to these challenges, nuclear-powered, 
large-deck carriers appeared necessary.61
One rather slender argument made in favor of the U.S. Navy’s examination of 
other carrier configurations was that the Soviet Navy had adopted them success-
fully. If the Soviet Navy thought it could challenge the U.S. Navy on the high seas, 
it was postulated, there must be something to these configurations—particularly 
if they could be built more cheaply than a large, nuclear-powered CV.62
Of particular interest were the Kiev-class “heavy aviation cruisers” or “heavy 
aircraft-carrying cruisers.” Kiev and its sisters appeared to be more-formidable 
warships than any individual platform in the U.S. inventory. Their foredecks bris-
tled with awesome displays of cruise and surface-to-air missiles. These included 
the SS-N-12 Sandbox (nuclear capable), the SA-N-3 Shtorm, the SA-N-4 Gecko, 
the SUW-N-1 ASW rocket (nuclear capable), and the RBU-6000 depth charge 
system. Additionally, they carried 76 mm guns, torpedo tubes, and an assortment 
of close-in weapons. Their afterdecks were taken up with an angled flight deck 
that could accommodate a mix of thirty-two V/STOL aircraft and helicopters.63 
Essentially, they were Moffett’s flying-deck cruisers.
9
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However, by the later stages of the Cold War it became apparent that although 
the Kiev class was capable of performing modest strike-at-sea missions, it was 
not designed to provide the capabilities of an aircraft carrier. It had a special-
ized mission: defending the Soviet nuclear strategic-ballistic-missile bastions in 
waters close to the Soviet Union.64 This was a mission that the U.S. Navy obvi-
ously did not have. The missions that the U.S. Navy did have required capabilities 
beyond those offered by combat-limited V/STOL aircraft. The flying-deck cruis-
ers—as devastating as they seemed visually—simply did not fit U.S. operational 
requirements.
THREE POINTS FOR DISCUSSION
What can one conclude from this history? Three points identify themselves.
The first is that—operationally—the U.S. Navy has sound reasons for prefer-
ring a large-deck aircraft carrier over any smaller variant.65 History is our truest 
laboratory, and fast, large-displacement, heavy-tonnage, full-flight-deck aircraft 
carriers have proved superior in war. With nuclear power plants, they are globally 
deployable. They are not some sort of naval fetish.
Second, the argument that small carriers can substitute for them—even in a 
world of modern technology—is unproven.66 They certainly could not during 
World War II, nor in subsequent naval operations. V/STOL aircraft remain a less-
capable substitute for conventional carrier aircraft.67 One can speculate regarding 
the damage a People’s Liberation Army DF-21 missile might effect if it struck a 
large carrier—but first it would have to hit it, which would be far from certain in 
a war characterized by deception and a struggle for use of the electromagnetic 
environment.68 A small carrier, if struck, is less likely to survive. Again, this was 
demonstrated in World War II.
The third point is that, in the end, the debate over aircraft carriers always boils 
down to cost. Their acquisition costs are much higher than for other ships and 
other single-item defense programs, making them a natural target for criticism. 
Yet that always has been true. The conversion costs of Lexington and Saratoga 
were estimated initially at $21 million each, but their final costs were $40 million 
apiece—a nearly 90 percent cost overrun. And yes, there were a lot of scream-
ing critics at the time—including congressmen. Combined with a simplistic per-
ception of vulnerability, high costs tend to cause critics to declare aircraft carri-
ers “unaffordable” and “vulnerable.”69 However, it is very fair to ask—as former 
Secretary of the Navy John F. Lehman and Steven Wills phrase the question—
“Compared to what?”70
As Norman Friedman writes, “The belief that somehow the aviation com-
munity and the carrier designers are conspiring to hide the real advantages of 
smaller and less expensive carriers persists to this day.”71 However, small does 
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not inevitably prove to be less expensive. An interesting acquisition case study 
would be to investigate whether the total spent (for ships, modules, and required 
developmental programs) of the Littoral Combat Ship program—in which ships 
already are starting to be decommissioned—would have bought one carrier or 
two (particularly if, as Lehman and Wills propose, they were the size of a non-
nuclear USS Midway).72
Likewise, instead of proposing only to reduce the carrier force to fund oth-
er defense programs, it is logical and analytically sound to ask which programs 
could be reduced or eliminated to fund carriers—especially if we are firm in our 
desire to avoid another Afghanistan-type commitment and to adjust our defense 
resources accordingly. After all, aircraft carriers are combat-proven systems, 
while their vulnerability to modern military technology remains unproven.73
To suggest a more thorough study of alternatives that includes a fair hearing 
for high capabilities as well as lesser ones does not necessarily represent unquali-
fied support for large aircraft carriers.74 On the other hand, neither does it mean 
they should be rejected summarily.
A POSTSCRIPT: DID THE PLAN CONSIDER THE FLYING-DECK 
CRUISER—AND REJECT IT?
The first People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) aircraft carrier, the ex–Soviet 
Navy Varyag (now Liaoning), ostensibly was purchased by a “private” People’s 
Republic of China (PRC) company for conversion into a floating casino; it never 
became a casino. That is a story well known.75 A second carrier was built to the 
same specifications. The third (and larger) carrier now under construction is 
an attempt to incorporate new technologies developed for the latest U.S. carrier, 
such as the electromagnetic aircraft launch system (i.e., EMALS).76
Less known is the fact that PRC companies also purchased two of the four ex-
Soviet Kiev-class heavy-aviation cruisers, ostensibly as theme-park attractions. 
Neither was particularly successful in that intended role. The first (ex-Kiev) later 
was converted into a “luxury” hotel (reported to be near insolvency, having failed 
to attract sufficient guests).77 The second (ex-Minsk), with its parent theme park 
failing, was acquired by the PRC government in 2016 for display in a naval mu-
seum in Jiangsu.78
It is not unreasonable to ponder whether these flying-deck cruisers were pur-
chased as speculative private ventures with the hope that they (like Varyag) would 
be purchased, in turn, by the PLAN. The incongruous nature of their “private” ac-
quisition—which included the cost of towing two poorly maintained large hulks 
to China to be massively refurbished for use in a relatively low-revenue indus-
try—primes this speculation. Although there is no available documentation, it is 
very logical that they were examined (to some extent) as potential additions to 
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the PLAN fleet but were rejected. Perhaps the repair, upgrading, and conversion 
costs were seen as too great. The mission for which they were built—defense of 
the Soviet nuclear-ballistic-missile submarine bastions—is not a PLAN mission 
(as far as we know).
Or perhaps, like the United States in the 1930s, the PRC has determined that 
larger, all-aviation ships are a superior (in fact, the most desirable) method for 
bringing airpower to sea.
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